State of Utah v. Eddie G. Kucharski : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
State of Utah v. Eddie G. Kucharski : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott L. Wiggins; Arnold and Wiggins, P.C.; Counsel for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Laura B. Dupaix; Assistant Attorney General; Counsel for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Kucharski, No. 20100283 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2279
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
Case No. 20100283-CA 
V. 
EDDIE G. KUCHARSKI, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from Sentence Review entered March 9, 2 010, in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, 
presiding 
SCOTT L WIGGINS (5820) 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Counsel for Appellant 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Counsel for Appellee 
RLED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
F E B - 8 2011 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
v. 
EDDIE G. KUCHARSKI, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20100283-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from Sentence Review entered March 9, 2010, in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, 
presiding 
SCOTT L WIGGINS (5820) 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Counsel for Appellant 
105 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Counsel for Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. KUCHARSKI OF HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST THE DISQUALIFICATION 
OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE FOR ACTUAL BIAS OR 
PREJUDICE 9 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 9 
B. Recusal or Disqualification 11 
CONCLUSION 17 
ADDENDA 19 
Addendum A: Objection to Presentence Report (R. 14 0-50) 
Addendum B: State v. Kucharski, 2009 UT App 295 
(Memorandum Decision) (per curiam) 
Addendum C: Sentence Review hearing transcript (R. 278) 
Addendum D: Minutes Sentence Review (R. 2 5 9) 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page(s) 
Federal Cases 
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S . Ct. 1843 (2002) 10,17 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838 
(1993) 10 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U . S . 668 , 104 S. Ct 2052 
(1984) 9 , 1 0 , 1 1 
S t a t e Cases 
Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P. 2d 803 (Utah 1988) 1,9 
Haslaw v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948) 16 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480 10 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 
513 U.S. 966, 115 S . Ct . 431 (1994) 11 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct . 3270 (1990) 10 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986) 11 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990) 12 
State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 376 1 
State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied, 487 
U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988) 12,13,15 
State v. Perry, 8 99 P. 2d 12 3 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 9 
State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, 122 P.3d 895 1 
State v. Strain, 885 P. 2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 1 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Templin, 805 P. 2d 182 (Utah 1990) 10,11 
State v. Wright, 893 P. 2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 10 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2) (e) 1 
COURT RULES CITED 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3 (C) (1) (b) (1981) 12 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3E(1) (a) (2009) 12 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(1)(a) (2010) 12 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29 7,8,11,12,16 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
U.S. Const. amend. VI 1,7,9 
IV 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2) (e) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether trial counsel denied Mr. Kucharski of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing 
to request the disqualification of the sentencing judge for actual 
bias or prejudice. To make such a showing, a defendant must show, 
first, that counsel rendered a deficient performance, falling 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and, second, that counsel's performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. 
DeLand, 763 P. 2d 803 (Utah 1988) . The appellate court reviews 
such a claim as a matter of law. State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 
419, %5, 122 P.3d 895; State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^20, 984 P.2d 
376; State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
U.S. Const. amend . VI 1,7,9 
1 
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The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, if 
any, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the 
body and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, on October 25, 2005, appeared with appointed trial 
counsel before the district court pursuant to a negotiated plea 
and entered a plea of no contest to Communications Fraud, a third-
degree felony. The trial court directed that a presentence 
investigation report (PSI) be prepared for sentencing. 
Prior to sentencing, Defendant, through counsel, filed an 
Objection to the Presentence Report. At sentencing, without 
addressing the objections to the PSI, the district court sentenced 
Defendant to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison. Defendant appealed. 
On appeal, Defendant, among other things, argued that the 
district court erred by failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in 
the PSI, which error the State conceded. This Court, by way of 
Memorandum Decision issued October 16, 2009, remanded the case for 
the sentencing judge to consider the objections to the PSI and 
make findings as to whether the information objected to was 
2 
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accurate and then determine whether the information is relevant to 
sentencing. 
On remand, Defendant's appointed trial counsel appeared on 
March 4, 2010, for a Sentence Review hearing to address the 
numerous objections. After the hearing, the court refused to 
revise the sentence. 
The district court signed the Minutes Sentence Review on 
March 9, 2 010. Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on April 
2, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 25, 2005, Defendant appeared with appointed 
trial counsel before the district court pursuant to a negotiated 
plea and entered a plea of no contest to Communications Fraud, a 
third-degree felony (R. 28-32). 
2 . The trial court directed that a presentence 
investigation report (PSI) be prepared for sentencing (R. 279:58-
59) . 
3. Prior to sentencing, Defendant, through counsel, filed 
an Objection to the Presentence Report (R. 140-50). See Objection 
to Presentence Report, R. 140-50, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached to this Brief as Addendum A. 
3 
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4. At sentencing, without addressing the objections to the 
PSI, the district court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate 
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 279:80-
81) . 
5. Defendant appealed (R. 173-74). 
6. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that 
the district court erred by failing to resolve alleged 
inaccuracies in the PSI, which error the State conceded (R. 229). 
7. By way of Memorandum Decision (Not For Official 
Publication) issued October 16, 2009, this Court remanded the case 
for the sentencing judge to consider the objections to the PSI and 
make findings as to whether the information objected to was 
accurate and then determine whether the information is relevant to 
sentencing (Id. at 229-30) . See State v. Kucharski, 2009 UT App 
295 (Memorandum Decision) (per curiam) (R. 228-31), a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to this Brief as Addendum B. 
8. On remand, Defendant's appointed trial counsel raised 
numerous inaccuracies in the PSI at the Sentence Review hearing on 
March 4, 2010 (R. 278). 
9. The following exchange occurred at the outset of the 
hearing on March 4, 2010, in which trial counsel raised one of the 
inaccuracies in the PSI: 
4 
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THE COURT: 
MS. GEORGE: 
THE COURT: 
MS. GEORGE: 
THE COURT: 
MS. GEORGE: 
THE COURT: 
MS. GEORGE: 
THE COURT: 
Okay. You still talking about the 
attitude orientation paragraph? 
Yes, your Honor. 
Well, I'm going to tell you, 
counsel, and I don't have any 
disrespect for you, but I can tell 
you that we've been through this. 
I've had Mr. Kucharski on a case 
before this case, and I've had more 
stories that I have heard that he 
has been rebutted by a bunch of 
other people that he's plead guilty 
to and then he comes back and gets 
a new attorney and then he 
basically says all the same old 
stories again. 
Yes, your Honor. 
And so if you want to go through 
all these this way, I'm more than 
happy to do it, but I made my 
ruling on that. I'm required to 
make the finding. I made a finding 
and I'm not going to have things 
reargued. 
And I understand that, your Honor. 
My concern is just then I'm put in 
a position as his current counsel 
where Mr. Kucharski wanted these 
issues addressed. If I don't 
address them then I too am --
I'm not faulting you for addressing 
them. I'm just telling you what's 
the history. 
Yes, your Honor, 
--of this case and previous cases. 
(R. 278:12:2-24). See Sentence Review hearing transcript, R. 278, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached to this Brief as 
Addendum C.l 
A copy of the Sentence Review hearing transcript is 
contained in the record at R. 275. 
also 
5 
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10. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court in 
the course of determining whether to revise the sentence, stated 
the following: 
What I would say in response to what we have 
done today is all of these changes that you've 
made, even if you want to take out the attitude 
and orientation change, the problem with this case 
and the problem that I didn't go along with what 
the plea was, was because Mr. Kucharski had had a 
history with me. And that paragraph under 
investigator comment, the second paragraph, the 
first sentence, the defendant has established 
instances of repetitive criminal conduct and 
continued criminal behavior. 
And that was the issue that was critical. 
And it was the issue that he was going from 
company to company, doing similar types of crime, 
and basically thinking he could get away with it. 
That more than anything else -- it wasn't the dog 
license failure. It really wasn't anything about 
the -- other than the record that I had had with 
him. And despite what the recommendation was by 
the county or the defendant was that he deserved 
to go to prison because of the continued behavior. 
Probation hadn't changed him in the past under 
supervised probation, and he continued to commit 
crimes. 
And so I'm stating as a matter of fact and 
law that all the inaccuracies that have been 
addressed here that I have agreed to and agreed to 
what Mr. Kucharski said would not and will not 
change the sentence that I gave him to go to zero 
to five years in prison. So I do not see any 
reason to revise the sentence because those things 
did not affect it. 
(R. 278:36-37). 
11. The district court signed the Minutes Sentence Review on 
March 9, 2010, which was accordingly entered that same day (R. 
6 
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259) . See Minutes Sentence Review , R. 259, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached to this Brief as Addendum D. 
12. Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on April 2, 
2010 (R. 260-63). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Trial counsel denied Mr. Kucharski of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing 
to request the disqualification of the sentencing judge for actual 
bias or prejudice. In the course of this sentence review 
proceeding, Defendant's trial counsel learned or with the exercise 
of reasonable diligence should have realized the bias or prejudice 
grounds upon which to move for disqualification of Judge Kay in 
the instant case. Trial counsel, by failing to request the 
disqualification, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 
This failure fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, which is demonstrated by existing Utah case 
law concerning the standard for disqualification, including the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, as previously discussed, Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 29, and the judge's comments demonstrating 
actual bias or prejudice in this case. 
The comments made by Judge Kay in the instant case 
demonstrate actual bias or prejudice against Defendant. Had trial 
7 
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counsel moved for disqualification, there is a reasonable 
likelihood, based on Judge Kay's comments, that a recusal would 
have occurred or that another judge would have been assigned to 
the case. But, due to the failure to file such, a motion, 
Defendant was precluded from even having the disqualification 
matter duly considered. 
Just prior to the initial comments of actual bias being made, 
the judge had essentially refused to make a change to the PSI 
because he simply did not believe the facts as Defendant attempted 
to present them to the court. Moreover, the judge, after making 
numerous corrections to the PSI, determined, as a matter of 
course, that the inaccuracies would not and will not change the 
sentence the court previously imposed. The comments of actual 
bias in the instant case cast a shadow of suspicion on the 
fairness and consideration given to the inaccuracies presented to 
the court. 
Trial counsel's failure to move for disqualification cannot, 
under the circumstances of the case, be considered sound trial 
strategy. The judge's comments demonstrated actual bias or 
prejudice against Defendant -- and there was nothing detrimental 
to Defendant in moving for such a disqualification as dictated by 
Rule 29. Based on the actual bias or prejudice shown and the 
circumstances of this case, but for counsel's unprofessional 
8 
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errors, there is a reasonable probability that the results of the 
sentence review would have been different. Consequently, because 
both prongs of the test have been established, the proceeding is 
inherently unreliable and the result cannot stand. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. KUCHARSKI OF HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST THE DISQUALIFICATION 
OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE FOR ACTUAL BIAS OR 
PREJUDICE. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment2 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2 064. This two-pronged test - adopted by Utah courts -
requires a defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P. 2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 
2The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that Mi]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
9 
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1995); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
XN[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized 
not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the 
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, 
a fair sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 
S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). Consequently, if a defendant meets both 
prongs of the test, "then the proceeding is inherently unreliable 
and the result cannot stand." See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 
695, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002) . 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
uxidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. '" State v. Templin, 805 P., 2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). " [T]o overcome this 
presumption," the defendant "must demonstrate that the challenged 
actions cannot be considered sound strategy under the 
circumstances. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^89, 150 P.3d 480 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2052). 
10 
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To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P. 2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 
(Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
B. Recusal or Disqualification 
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in 
part: 
A party to any action or the party's attorney may 
file a motion to disqualify a judge. The motion 
shall be accompanied by a certificate that the 
motion is filed in good faith and shall be 
supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient 
to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of 
interest. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1)(A). According to the rule, the motion 
must be filed "after commencement of the action, but not later 
than 20 days after the last of the following:" [1] "assignment of 
the action or hearing to the judge; [2] appearance of the party or 
the party's attorney; or [3] the date on which the moving party 
learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
11 
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learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based." See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 29 (c) (1) (B) (i)- (iii) . 
Upon the filing of the motion, the judge, who is the subject 
of the motion and affidavit, "shall, without further hearing, 
enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and 
affidavit to a reviewing judge." See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) (2) . 
Thereafter, u[t]he judge shall take no further action in the case 
until the motion is decided." Id. 
In State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied, 487 
U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that a trial judge "should recuse himself when his 'impartiality' 
might reasonably be questioned." Id. at 1094 (citing Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct 3(C)(1)(b) (1981));3 see also State v. Gardner, 
789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 
S.Ct. 1837 (1990) (emphasizing that " [n]othing is more damaging to 
the public confidence in the legal system than the appearance of 
bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.") . This standard, 
according to the Court, "should be given careful consideration by 
3See Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3E(1) (a) (2009) applicable to 
the instant case. For information purposes only, the Code of 
Judicial Conduct was repealed and reenacted effective April 1, 2010. 
The new Code is based on the ABA Model Code issued in 2007. The 
provision cited in State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 487 U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988), is currently located in 
Rule 2.11(A) (1) (a) of the new Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. 
12 
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the trial judge." Neeley, 748 P. 2d at 1094. "It may require 
recusal in instances where no actual bias is shown." Id. 
Throughout the proceeding on remand in the instant case, the 
district court demonstrated actual bias or prejudice against 
Defendant through various comments concerning Defendant. For 
example, the court's bias or prejudice was demonstrated by the 
following exchange at the outset of the hearing on March 4, 2 010, 
in which the trial counsel raised one of several inaccuracies in 
the PSI: 
THE COURT: 
MS. GEORGE:4 
THE COURT: 
MS. GEORGE: 
THE COURT: 
Okay. You still talking about the 
attitude orientation paragraph? 
Yes, your Honor. 
Well, I'm going to tell you, 
counsel, and I don't have any 
disrespect for you, but I can tell 
you that we've been through this. 
I've had Mr. Kucharski on a case 
before this case, and I've had more 
stories that I have heard that he 
has been rebutted by a bunch of 
other people that he's plead guilty 
to and then he comes back and gets 
a new attorney and then he 
basically says all the same old 
stories again. 
Yes, your Honor. 
And so if you want to go through 
all these this way, I'm more than 
happy to do it, but I made my 
ruling on that. I'm required to 
make the finding. I made a finding 
The district court appointed Ms. Julie George as appointed trial 
counsel for the purpose of the proceedings on remand (R. 276:9:21-
22) . 
13 
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and I'm not going to have things 
reargued. 
MS. GEORGE: And I understand that, your Honor. 
My concern is just then I'm put in 
a position as his current counsel 
where Mr. Kucharski wanted these 
issues addressed. If I don't 
address them then I too am --
THE COURT: I'm not faulting you for addressing 
them. I'm just telling you what's 
the history. 
MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: --of this case and previous cases. 
(R. 278:12:2-24). Additionally, at the conclusion of the hearing 
on March 4, 2010, the district court in the course of determining 
whether to revise the sentence, stated the following: 
What I would say in response to what we have 
done today is all of these changes that you've 
made, even if you want to take out the attitude 
and orientation change, the problem with this case 
and the problem that I didn't go along with what 
the plea was, was because Mr. Kucharski had had a 
history with me. And that paragraph under 
investigator comment, the second paragraph, the 
' first sentence, the defendant has established 
instances of repetitive criminal conduct and 
continued criminal behavior. 
And that was the issue that was critical. 
And it was the issue that he was going from 
company to company, doing similar types of crime, 
and basically thinking he could get away with it. 
That more than anything else -- it wasn't the dog 
license failure. It really wasn't anything about 
the -- other than the record that I had had with 
him. And despite what the recommendation was by 
the county or the defendant was that he deserved 
to go to prison because of the continued behavior. 
Probation hadn't changed him in the past under 
supervised probation, and he continued to commit 
crimes. 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 278:36-37). 
In the course of this sentence review proceeding, Defendant's 
trial counsel learned or with the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have realized the bias or prejudice grounds upon which to 
move for disqualification of Judge Kay in the instant case. By 
failing to request the disqualification, trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel's failure fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
which is demonstrated by existing Utah case law concerning the 
standard for disqualification, including the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, as previously discussed, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
29, and the comments demonstrating actual bias or prejudice in 
this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Neeley, addressed reversible error 
based on a trial judge's failure to recuse, stating: 
But, while we recommend the practice that a judge 
recuse himself where there is a colorable claim of 
bias or prejudice, absent a showing of actual bias 
or an abuse of discretion, failure to do so does 
not constitute reversible error as long as the 
requirements of [Utah R. Crim. P. 2 9] are met. 
Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094-95. In the instant case, the comments 
made by Judge Kay demonstrate actual bias or prejudice against 
Defendant. Had trial counsel moved for disqualification, there is 
a reasonable likelihood, based on Judge Kay's comments, that a 
15 
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recusal would have occurred or that another judge would have been 
assigned to the case. But, due to the failure to file such a 
motion, Defendant was precluded from even having the 
disqualification matter duly considered. 
Of particular note is the fact that just prior to the initial 
comments of actual bias being made, the judge had essentially 
refused to make a change to the PSI because he simply did not 
believe the facts as Defendant attempted to present them to the 
court (R. 278:10-11). Moreover, the judge, after making numerous 
corrections to the PSI, determined, as a matter of course, that 
the inaccuracies uwould not and will not change the sentence that 
I gave him . . . ." (R. 278:37:6-11). The comments of actual bias 
in the instant case cast a shadow of suspicion on the trial 
judge's fairness and consideration given to the inaccuracies 
presented by Defendant to the court. See Haslam v. Morrison, 113 
Utah 14, 20, 190 P.2d 520 (1948). 
Trial counsel's failure to move for disqualification cannot, 
under the circumstances of the case, be considered sound trial 
strategy. The judge's comments demonstrated actual bias or 
prejudice against Defendant -- and there was nothing detrimental 
to Defendant in moving for such a disqualification as dictated by 
Rule 29. Based on the actual bias or prejudice shown and the 
circumstances of this case, but for counsel's unprofessional 
16 
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errors, there is a reasonable probability that the results of the 
sentence review would have been different. Because both prongs of 
the test have been established, the proceeding is inherently 
unreliable and the result cannot stand. See Bell v. Cone, 535 
U.S. 685, 695, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (2002). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Kucharski respectfully requests 
that this Court set aside Judge Kay's review of his sentence in 
the instant case and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of February, 2011. 
ARNOLfe & WIGGINS, P.C. 
'Wj^ gj/ns 
fdn^-^ppel lant 
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I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following on this Q day of February, 2011: 
Ms. Laura B. Dupaix 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, U5L 84114-0854 
Counsel for the fetate of Utah 
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Addendum C: Sentence Review hearing transcript (R. 278) 
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Nathan N. Jardins, USB No. 8215 
The Lair Offices of Nftihan N. Jardiuc 
39 Exchange Place, Suhe 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/994-9$85 
Fax: 801/51M745 
Attorney for Defendant Eddie Q. Kucharski 
FtLEO AT BENCh 
OOURTROOM 2 
MAR 13 2007 
Upton Oistrict Court 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT. STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah 
Ptatattfif, 
vs. 
Eddie Kucharski 
Defendant 
Objection to Presentence Report 
Case No. 04-1701630 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
MJEASE TAKE NOTICE that Eddie Kucharsld by and throng 
NL Jardine* hereby objects to the Presentence Report dated February 16,2007, for the following reason*: 
1 • On page X the second fiili paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates that Eddie Kucharski 
purchased a vehicle with a $3 8,000.00 bad oheck* Mr. Kjucharski relates that in June or July of 2007, he 
purchased a vehicle from Quality Dodge in Tooele, Utah. At the time he purchased the vehicle, he 
issued a check with the understanding that the check would not be cashed until Mr. Kudharaki received 
&nds from a sponsor, Eddie Kneharsld is the managcr/ovnaer of H&K Motor Sports. H&K Motor 
Sports is involved in the Nascar team business. Mr, KucharsJd's business owns several different race 
Objection to presentence report 
- v r 
CD19512418 
041701630 KUCHARSKf,EDDIE G 
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carsandteams. Mr. Kucharski believed at the time that they check was issued that he would be able to 
have the $38,000.00 within a three-week time frame because he anticipatedjhejstf^^ ~T 
-oncirftiHffpon^ Mr. Kucharski was arrested while they were awaiting for the 
money to come in from the sponsor. The car dealership understood the dynamics of this situation and : 
i 
'i 
bleached his agreement by cashing the check which is why, in part, the matter was dismissed. 
2. Mr. Kucharski indicates that at the first court appearance in this matter the prosecution told | 
him that they WW in the process of dismissing the matter. Three weeks later, the matter was dismissed. 
The car dealer was not out any money whatsoever due to the feet that Mr, Kucharski paid him for 
depreciation on the car. The statement in the Presentence Report that the district attorney had to actually 
file felony charges in order for the defendant to agree to return the vehicle is incorrect and inaccurate. 
3. Defendant objects to the second ML paragraph on page 2 ofthe Presentence Report v^ich 
j 
i] 
starts "A^tp^OrientfltJon/ In that paragraph, the Presentence Report indicates "The defendant j 
explanation of the offense is completely contradictory to that of his victim and to the employer he | 
exploited," Eddie Kucharski believes that he did not exploit his employer. This offense arose from a 
• f 
situation where Eddie Kucharski worked for Champion Windows and Patios (Champion). He agreed 
i 
with the manager of Champion, Greg Sfauaoway, that he could do some window jobs an the side. Greg 
Sbuno way agreed that Eddie Kucharski could do the window jobs with the only stipulation that they 
purchased the windows from Champion. One of the people that Eddie Kucharski agreed that he would 
do a windowjobfbr was a person by the name ofLaimy Hansen who is the victim in this case. Eddie 
2 
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Kucharski agreed with L«m^ He took a 
deposit from Lanny Hansen. He asked Greg Shunoway to order the windows^^jGieg-StemowayTSwer 
ordextri the windows Jgonseq^^ could not install the windows in Lanoy Hansen's 
home. As a result of the windows not behg instaUei I^ umy Hansen wa^ 
complaint against Eddie Kucharski Eddie Kucharski then has h ^ The 
employer in this matter, Champion, was not exploited. In feet, the employer wronged Eddie Kucharsid. 
4. It is Eddie Knchar^'s understanding that both he aixd Champion were sued as a result of the 
problem. Eddie Kucharsid was informed by Brett Klackston that Champion had actually cut a check to 
Lanny Hansen in settlement of the matter, 
5. From the day that Eddie Kuchax&ki received the service of a lawsuit, uirtaii^d^ytiaat he was 
supposed to be sentenced last year, he indicates that he was in negotiations with the civil attorney for 
Lanny Hansen in order to resolve the matter. He offered to install windows from a different company 
and he offered to make substantial payments since he no longer had the deposit given him by Lanny 
Hansca, but nothing was ever finali2ed between himself and L^^ attorney. 
6. On page 2, the second sentence of tile "Attitude-Orientation" paragraph, the Presentence 
Report Investigator indicates "He claims to have 'returned the deposit* in his statement of the offense,*1 
The && of the matter is that a careful reading of the defendant's statement of the offense could lead to 
the conclusion that when Eddie Kucharsid indicated that he "returned the deposit* he was talking about 
the deposit for a different job, not the job related to the Lanny Hansen order* 
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AJ a matter of clearing up the Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharaki hereby informs the oourt that 
at the time that he took on the job for Lanny Ha^ 
of Greg WjIUama^ job for Greg Williams he found out that he 
couldnt get the materials through Champion. As a result of that he couldnt get the materials so at that 
point Eddie Kucharaki returned the deposit cm the patio job for Greg Williams but he couldn't return the 
deposit on the window job for Lanny Hansen because Greg Shunoway was still indicating at that point 
that the windowswere going to be forthcoming, but they never were. In any event, there is a statement 
in the Presentence Report that indicates he claims to have "r^^ The reality is that 
when Eddie Kucharaki claims to return the deposit, he was talking about the deposit to Greg Williams 
for the patio job, not the deposit to Lanny Hansen for the window job, 
7. In the fourth sentence of the Attitud^Qrientatioft paragraph. the Presentence Report 
Investigator indicates "The defendant actually tries to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing 
blame on his manager at the time." Even in Eddie Kuchar&ld's statement, he indicates that he feel* bad, 
nl feel horrible thatLanny lost money. That was never intended.... I am working two jobs to pay Lanny 
back-" Obviously, Eddie Kucbarski is not trying to absolve himself from full responsibility by placing 
blame on the manager at the time. Clearly, however, the manager was at fault Eddie Kucharaki 
indicates that the manager was fired, terminated from his job, due to the dealings that occurred with 
reapect to this matter and for other similar reasons. 
8. Eddie Kucharaki disputes sentence 5 of the Atlitufo-Orientetion. paragraph of the Presentence 
4 
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Report which indicates that "The fact is he never submitted the work order for the windows, insisted that 
the vi ctim issue the checks directly to himself and then cashed the checks \hxov 
account." The f^ of the^natte^ the arrangement that Eddie Kucharski had with the 
manager at the time, Greg Shunoway> he was to tell Greg that there were windows and more materi als 
that 'were needed, and GTeg Shunoway was to order those windows or materials* Eddie Kucharsld would 
then receive the materials and do the job on his own time. That was the arrangement that Eddie 
Kucharski had with his manager. It was a win-win situation for all. Champion would receive money for 
the materials that were ordered fiom them and Eddie Kucharski would make money on the side. 
However, there was never an arrangement between Eddie Kucharski and the manager of the store, Greg 
Shnnoway, that he would submit a work order for the windows. That was not part of the arrangement. 
The Presentence Report makes it seem as though Ecfdic Kucharski should have issued a work order for 
the windows. 
Of course, the victim, Lanny Hansen, was required to pay Eddie Kucharski directly for the work 
due to the fact that Eddie Kucharski was not working for Champion when he agreed to install the 
windows, rather he was working for himself as an independent contractor. Eddie Kucharski arranged for 
the windows and materials to be delivered from Champion and was going to perform the work himself. 
Of course, the victim was to pay him directly for the windows, Eddie Kucharski did not cash the 
payment for the windows through his personal checking account, in feet, Eddie Kucharski cashed the 
checks through Lanny Hansen's checking account He juat simply cashed the checks that ware delivered 
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to him by his customer. 
9. The last sentence in the Atdtude-Orient&tign paragraph indicates^ M 
oxientatiigjstoiainiTri f ze^js^nvotvaffienf^^ The fact of the matter is that the defendant1* ; 
__—_—- - - i 
attitude is to clear up what actuaUy occwed as ftr as th^ .j 
Kucharaki knows and understands that he should lurt have spent ttomon^ that was given to h i a He i 
knows that it was a big mistake to use the money for his personal use wbea he should have reserved it to 
do the job for which he was hired, He recognizes that that was one of the biggest mistakes of his life due 
to the fact that he did not have the money to Lanny Hansen when Greg Shunoway foiled to order the 
windows and the windows were neverSlivered. Eddie KucharsJd has now spent 87 days in jail due to 
this matter. 
The reason Eddie Kuaberski was performing side jobs is because he needed extra money because 
his son had spent two weeks in the ICU and he had a huge hospital bill to pay. Additionally, Eddie M 
KucharsJd was being promoted in the company he worked for at the same time of the alleged events* 
The promotion involved a move to Dallas, Texas. The move was not being paid for by the company, so j 
Eddie KueharsVi used the money for hospital bills and moving expenses for his family. He recognizes, i 
however, that he should not have used the money for anything except for performing the work for the 
customer who had paid him in advance for his servioes. 
As Eddie Kucharski understands it, the work that he was going to do for Lanny Hansen was going 
to be done and that the materials were going to be paid for by Champion. Champion was going to be 
6 
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taking money out of his paychecks for lie cost of the windows. The labor that was going to be 
accomplished would be accomplished by Eddie Kucharski, It would have odyjakenl 
complete fee job, 
10. With respect to the paragraphs under 'INVESTIGATOR COMMENT" on page 2 of the 
Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharski admits that the current wrongdoing occurred during the time that 
he was on supervised probation* He also admits that there were plans for the supervised probation to be 
terminated. In feet, the supervised probation wasin fact terminated suocessMy. 
Eddie Kucharski did successfully complete supervised probation. The fact of the matter iathar at 
the end of 1997 through the end of 2000, he did rack up a series of criminal charges. His probation was 
revoked and reinstated twice; however, Eddie Kucharski also believes that he will certainly perform well 
on probation if he is only given the chance* Once again, his last probation did end successfully. 
11. Lanny Hansen has told Eddie Kucharski that he is recoxnmeiKiing to the prosecutor and the 
court that no additional time be served by Eddie in thismatter. Mr, Hansen knew that Eddie Kucharski 
was working independently from Champion when he agreed to do the work on Lanny Hansen's home. 
Mr. Hansen knew that was the reajton he w^ Eddie 
Kucharski did not tell Lanny Hansen that the windows were a promotional deal as indicated on page 3, 
first fall paragraph, sentence 3 of the Presentence Report He did tell Lanny Hansen that he would do 
the work cheaper than he could get the work done through Champion. The amount of $10,398.00 was 
paid to Eddie Kucharski by Lanny Hansen. 
V 
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When Mr. Hansen contacted Eddie Kneharski, vindicated on page 3, in the fi^ 
of the Presentence Report, Eddie Kucharskl did inform Mr. Hansen titewoi^^ 
heliadjjami^^ delay was also caused by the fact that he hadn't received 
the windows from Champion yet, 
Yet, the manager of Champion* Greg Shnaoway, told Lanny Hansen that Eddie Kucharsld had 
"possibly moved to Arizona", for the probable reason that Greg Sfcunoway wanted to cover up his own 
wrongdoing in the matter. As indicated above, ultimately, the manager, Greg Shunoway, was fired from 
his job for the dealings that he made in this instance as well as other instances similar to this incident 
Of course, the manager of Champion never received a work order due to the feet that the work was not 
done through Champion, it was done through Eddie KucharskL 
Eddie Kucharsld never submitted a work order to Champion, Eddie Kucharsld did give Mr. 
Hansen a document which indicated the location and measurements of windows. Apparently, Mr. 
Hansen sent thatdocument to Champion and was ixrfoimed thai the document w The 
Presentence Report also indicates on page 3, the second Ml paragraph, the last sentence, "Evidently the 
work order had a substantial amount of missing information." The fact of the matter is that there was 
never a work order that was submitted to Champion by Eddie Kueharski or from Mr. Hansen to Eddie 
Kucharsld. It was only ft worksheet where Eddie Kucharsld worked out the size of the windows and the 
price he would need to install the windows. 
13L With respetf to the third ftU pa 
8 
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i 
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16. With respect to the "VICTIM IMPACTJTMEMENT AND RE3IIIiniQN?Lon^affe^ef -
the Presentence Report, once again, Eddie Kucharski is sorry that the Hansens lost their money. He is 
Sony that he did not keep the deposit that they paid him so that he could pay it back to them. He did 
behave that he was going to be able to accomplish the work for them but he was wrong. He has spoke 
with Lamty Hansen who has indicated that I^nny Hansen has no tU feelings towa^ 
and that Lanny Hansen does not wan: to see Eddie Kucharski incarcerated for another period of time. 
17. Withrespect to the third to the last foil paragraph, second sentence, on page 7 of the 
Presentence Report, it is indicated "The defendant also works for H&K Motor Sports in their public 
relations office." Eddie Kucharski owns H&K Motor Sports. Similarly, sentence 4 of the same 
paragraph it states "From 1997 until 2004, the defendant was employed with Computex as a Sales 
Representative," Eddie Kucharski owned Computex and was not just a Sales Representative. Eddie 
Kucharski was making approximately SI 00,000.00 per year when he owned Computex, but he did 
dissolve the company to start a carter in racing cars. He believed at the time and continues to beiicvo 
that there is much more money involved in racing cars than there is in computers* 
DATED: February 28,2007 Respectfully submit 
Nathan N. Jardine 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the February 28,2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Presentence Report was served by facsimile and United States First Class Mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Richard L. Larsen, Esq. 
Davis County Prosecutor 
800 West State Street 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Fax: (801)4514328 
Lee Kenney, Investigator 
Blake Beesley, Supervisor 
Adult Probation and Parole 
Farmington A. P. & P. 
883 West 100 North 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Fax No.: 
Nathan N. Jardine 
KnehBAPOfcOyectioa to Presentence Report-flm 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Eddie G. Kucharski, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 16 2009 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070392-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 16, 2009) 
2009 UT App 295 
Second District, Farmington Department, 041701630 
The Honorable Thomas L. Kay 
Attorneys: Scott L. Wiggins, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenney, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Davis. 
PER CURIAM: 
Eddie G. Kucharski appeals his conviction for communications 
fraud arguing that (1) the district court erred in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, (2) the district court erred 
by failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to insure that the district court resolved the alleged 
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report. 
Kucharski first asserts that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Under Utah Code 
section 77-13-6(2), a guilty plea can be withdrawn only if it was 
"not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2) (2008). In determining whether a plea is knowingly and 
voluntarily made, a trial court must apply a subjective standard 
that examines whether the particular defendant entered his plea 
knowingly and voluntarily, as opposed to an objective test that 
would look at what a reasonable person would have done. See 
generally State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, \ 12, 79 P.3d 960. • 
Kucharski alleges that the district court improperly applied 
an objective standard in determining whether his plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily made rather than a subjective standard. 
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After reviewing the district court's ruling, it is clear that 
when the district court indicated that it would be untenable to 
use a subjective standard, it was not referring to whether 
Kucharski's actions should be reviewed under a reasonable person 
standard as opposed to an analysis based solely upon Kucharskifs 
impressions. Instead, the district court was discussing how to 
view Kucharski's testimony that his plea was not voluntarily made 
when he expressly stated at the time he entered his plea that his 
plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Contrary to Kucharski's 
arguments, the record demonstrates that the district court did 
review Kucharski's claims under a subjective standard. 
Specifically, in making its ruling the district court stated that 
it did not find a basis "in the testimony[,] or in the 
videotape[,] or in the record to indicate" that the plea was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made. Thus, the district court 
reviewed all available evidence, including Kucharski's attitude 
and reactions during the plea, before denying the motion to 
withdraw the plea. Under these circumstances, it is clear that 
the district court applied the appropriate standard in reviewing 
Kucharski's claim that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made . 
Kucharski next argues that the district court erred in 
failing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report. The State concedes that the district court 
failed to comply with Utah Code section 77-18-1(6) (a) by not 
resolving the alleged inaccuracies on the record. See id. § 77-
18-1(6) (a) (2008) . 
In State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, 94 P.3d 295, we held 
that the district court erred in failing to resolve Maroney's 
objections to the sentencing reports, and we remanded to allow 
the court to resolve the objections on the record. See id. ^ 31. 
We went on to state that " [i]f resolution of the objections 
affects the trial court's view of the appropriate sentence, the 
trial court may then revise the sentence accordingly." Id. This 
disposition is appropriate in the present case because Kucharski 
alleges that he was prejudiced by the failure to resolve the 
alleged inaccuracies in the report. Allowing the district court 
to revisit the sentences after resolving the alleged inaccuracies 
in the presentence investigation report gives appropriate 
deference to the district court's sentencing function. 
Accordingly, we remand the case so "the sentencing judge can 
consider the objections to the presentence report, make findings 
on the record as to whether the information objected to is 
accurate, and determine on the record whether that information is 
relevant to sentencing." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^ 4 4 , 973 
P.2d 404. After resolving the alleged inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report, the district court may revise 
the sentence as it deems appropriate. Our disposition makes it 
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unnecessary to consider alternative arguments alleging 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Affirmed in part and remanded. 
/. .^W^K^V 
Pamela T. Greenwood, ^ ^ Pam  
Presiding Judge 
'.&z#JL 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
James/£. Davis, grudge 
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March 4, 2010 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * 
MS. GEORGE: If you could call the State of Utah 
versus Kucharski, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. State of Utah vs. Eddie G. 
Kucharski. It's matter No. 33. This was set for a sentence 
review. Have the two attorneys ever got together to discuss 
this matter? 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, we tried. What 
Mr. Kucharski had proposed is that rather than go forward with 
the full resentence hearing, that if the court would consider 
having him on court probation once he paid off all of his 
restitution, and then he would abide by whatever rules the 
court set forth. If we could do it that way. 
It sounds like the county attorney office is not in 
agreement with that — 
THE COURT: Well, how can I do that if he's already 
on parole? 
MS. GEORGE: Well, that was the issue, your Honor. 
He believes that the way the court ruled on the appellate 
decision that he's set to be resentenced in its entirety. And 
if that is the case, we would like to address the court on 
putting him on probation versus sentencing him to prison or 
supervise — 
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THE COURT: No, the only thing that happened on here 
Ifve read the decision several times from the Utah Court of 
Appeals. It just indicated that there's no evidence in the 
record that the objections or alleged inaccuracies in the 
presentence report were ruled upon. And then if they are ruled 
— it says, We accordingly, we remand the case so the 
sentencing judge can consider the objections, make findings on 
the record as to whether the information objected to is 
accurate and determine on the record whether the information is 
relevant to sentencing. 
So that's what it says. Then after resolving the 
alleged inaccuracies, the District Court may revise the 
sentences if it deems appropriate. 
MS. GEORGE: And I think then that, your Honor, that 
would be — that's what you would be asking for is to revise 
the sentence. What he is seeking is not to be on AP&P 
supervision. He met with me and we discussed what had been 
happening. He's been having several concerns with them and how 
things are being handled. And he believes at this point if he 
could pay off restitution, he could set forth strict guidelines 
for court probation rather than having to check in with AP&P. 
And he'd ask the court to consider that as an option. 
THE COURT: Okay. What's the County's position? 
MR. POLL: Your Honor, our position is that just as 
the court indicated, that we're back here for resentence with 
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1 the court to make those findings regarding those issues that 
2 were raised and then have the defendant resentenced. He's on 
3 parole now. 
4 From the State's point of view, one of two things 
5 would need to happen, either he's — we would be recommending 
6 that he be sentenced to the Utah State Prison zero to five, 
7 give him credit for the time he served, and be put on parole. 
8 But that may require that he be taken down through the prison 
9 again and go through that booking process and then probably 
10 just release him back on parole. 
11 The other option is that he be resentenced. And our 
12 recommendation would be zero to five, suspended and credit for 
13 time served and be placed on AP&P probation, and he'd have to 
14 pay his restitution. But we would like to see him on probation 
15 with AP&P given his record, given this case. We don't think 
16 that he's amenable to a probation where he's not supervised. 
17 MS. GEORGE: And your Honor, in response to that, my 
18 client indicates that he is — the concern that he has with 
19 AP&P is with the particular supervisor, Casy Nelson. What he 
20 asks is that if it's at all possible to get another officer to 
21 supervise him other than Mr. Nelson, he'd be fine with that. 
22 He's working diligently to try to get the restitution paid off. 
23 J He's okay with being supervised for a year, but his concern is 
24 I just that Mr. Nelson has caused some issues, one of which 
25 I included losing some employment and some other things. And so 
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he'd ask if the court could make a condition of that, that it 
be a different officer to supervise him. 
THE COURT: Well, you know, with all due respect, you 
know, Mr. Kucharski is not in any position to dictate who he 
is, who he is going to be supervised by or how things are going 
to happen. I mean, the fact of this matter is I'm more than 
happy to come back and you set everything else, where you set 
forth what the problems are in the presentence report, you come 
up there with people that have evidence to say that those 
things are or are not the facts. I will then say, make rulings 
on the record, what, if that!s a misstatement in the 
presentence report or not a mistake in the presentence report, 
I will then determine if I have to revise the sentence. 
MS. GEORGE: And we're prepared to do that, your 
Honor. We are — he's got a list of issues that he wanted to 
address on the presentence report, and I can go through those 
paragraph by paragraph, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are those — is the State ready to 
proceed on? 
MR. POLL: Yes, your Honor. Are they the original or 
are they additional? 
MS. GEORGE: They would be the original. There's 29 
errors that he had listed out, but they would be what were 
covered, I believe, in the prior hearing. And I can list those 
out, and then if the county needs to address those, we can. 
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Some of them are more procedural. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, on page 2, paragraph 2, he 
indicated that there were felony charges that had to be filed 
before there was an exchange of the vehicle. His concern was 
that he was able to provide that the truck was returned while 
he was in custody before charges were ever filed, and there 
wasn't any outstanding money owed and the charges were 
dismissed. 
In reviewing that, I believe that is correct, the way 
Mr. Kucharski has it listed. So his concern was it leads your 
Honor to believe that they had to file criminal charges before 
he returned the motor vehicle, and that was not the case. 
THE COURT: Okay. What's the position of the county 
regarding, under criminal history on page 2 what has just been 
addressed? 
MR. POLL: This is regarding Menlove; is that 
correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
MR. POLL: The vehicle with Menlove. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, this was back in 2006. 
MS. GEORGE: This is page 2, paragraph 2. 
THE COURT: Well, it's 2007 it says. 
THE DEFENDANT: It was filed in — 
MR. POLL: Okay. I'm on it. 
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1 THE COURT: It's the last sentence under criminal 
2 history. 
3 MR. POLL: And if that's a matter, your Honor, that 
4 was never dealt with criminally, or if it was dismissed, the 
5 State would have no objection to that not being considered in 
6 part of the presentence investigation. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Then I'm going to delete that last 
8 sentence is that agreeable? 
9 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Or the last two sentences. 
11 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: And I'm putting my — okay. 
13 MS. GEORGE: And then on paragraph 3, your Honor, it 
14 indicates — he claims to have returned the deposit in the 
15 statement of the offense. It also claims that he met with the 
16 victim and tried to work out a solution. 
17 THE COURT: Which? 
18 MS. GEORGE: I'm sorry, page 2, paragraph 3. 
19 THE COURT: The attitude orientation? 
20 MS. GEORGE: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. What sentence? 
22 MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, it says in here that 
23 Mr. Kucharski claims to have returned the deposit in his 
24 statement of the offense. So where he wrote to the court 
25 regarding his statement of what occurred and claimed that he 
I 
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1 met with the victim and tried to work out a solution. The 
2 report states the defendant actually tries to absolve himself 
3 from full responsibility by placing the blame on the manager, 
4 that he never submitted the work order for the windows and 
5 insisted the victim issue the checks directly to himself. 
6 Your Honor, the fact is that Mr. Kucharski met with 
7 the victim's attorney, Nathaniel Ashcraft, he's in Sandy, Utah. 
8 I And what had happened is the manager of Mr. Kucharski at 
9 Champion Window authorized Mr. Kucharski to do sides jobs as 
10 they are referred to as long as Mr. Kucharski — 
11 THE COURT: Didn't we have the manager here at some 
12 point and he said exactly the opposite? I don't know what he's 
13 done with his attorney, but I remember this exactly as though 
14 it were yesterday. Mr. Kucharski came up and said something 
15 and the other person who was there said exactly the opposite. 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Mr. Arrington, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Pardon? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Mr. Arrington. 
19 THE COURT: No, I'm not talking about the attorney. 
20 I!m talking about — we had somebody here from the window 
21 company. 
22 MS. GEORGE: From Champion Windows. 
23 UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Your Honor, if I might interrupt. 
24 I was involved with the Champion Window. That is my 
25 recollection was that when he had met with the attorney may 
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1 have been one thing, but I know the manager, at least in my 
2 recollection, had always insisted exactly what his statement in 
3 J that presentence report was. 
4 MS. GEORGE: Yeah, and what, what we're referring to 
5 is the manager that was supervising Mr. Kucharski. At the time 
6 Mr. Kucharski came before your Honor for sentencing that 
7 individual, that manager that had supervised my client was 
8 gone. And that!s not who was supervising Mr. Kucharski at the 
9 time. 
10 And so what my client is saying, what Mr. Kucharski 
11 is saying at this point, is at the time he did the windows, his 
12 supervising manager at that time allowed him to do sides jobs. 
13 And that's how the situation worked out. The gentleman who 
14 would have come to the sentencing hearing, the last sentence 
15 and talked was not the individual who was involved with 
16 Mr. Kucharski at the time. He was someone new. 
17 THE COURT: What's the County's position regarding 
18 that response? 
19 MR. POLL: Your Honor, you've — I think you have 
20 heard the explanation from the county and from the defendant. 
21 So we just ask the court to make whatever finding you feel is 
22 appropriate for those claims. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Based upon both what happened at 
24 the time previously, at the previous sentence and at the 
25 corrections that were pointed out right now and were pointed 
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1 out then, Ifm not making any changes because I do not believe 
2 the facts are as Mr. Kucharski says. I believe they are as 
3 stated under the issue of attitude orientation is what was said 
4 at the time of sentencing by the victim in the case. 
5 (Counsel conferring with Defendant.) 
6 MS. GEORGE: So what Mr. Kucharski is saying, your 
7 Honor, is that there were two jobs that he was working on. One 
8 which was for patio work and one which was for the windows. 
9 When — when he was told that the windows would not be 
10 completed and that there were issues, he did return the one 
11 check which was for the patio work and that the window's check 
12 was not returned — two different customers. His concern is 
13 that he did indeed return a check for one of these side jobs, 
14 but it looks as though he's lying about returning the check for 
15 the windows. 
16 And what he is saying, your Honor, is I've never said 
17 I returned the check for the windows. That I did not do. It 
18 was for the other side job. So I think what they've done is 
19 taken two separate work situations and combined them as one. 
20 And what Mr. Kucharski is saying is for the second incident, he 
21 did return that check, he didn't return it for the windows. 
22 So the facts are the same, meaning the people for the 
23 windows have never had their check returned, but Mr. Kucharski 
24 is just concerned that it places sort of a taint that he's 
25 being evasive or dishonest before the court and he wants that, 
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1 that issue corrected. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. You still talking about the 
3 attitude orientation paragraph? 
4 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Well, Ifm going to tell you, counsel, and 
6 I don't have any disrespect for you, but I can tell you that 
7 we've been through this. I've had Mr. Kucharski on a case 
8 before this case, and I've had more stories that I have heard 
9 that he has been rebutted by a bunch of other people that he's 
10 plead guilty to and then he comes back and gets a new attorney 
11 and then he basically says all the same old stories again. 
12 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: And so if you want to go through all 
14 these this way, I'm more than happy to do it, but I made my 
15 ruling on that. I'm required to make the finding. I made a 
16 finding and I'm not going to have things reargued. 
17 MS. GEORGE: And I understand that, your Honor. My 
18 concern is just then I'm put in a position as his current 
19 counsel where Mr. Kucharski wanted these issues addressed. If 
20 I don't address them then I too am — 
21 THE COURT: I'm not faulting you for addressing them. 
22 I'm just telling you what's the history. 
23 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: — of this case and previous cases. 
25 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-554 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 The second — excuse me, the third issue that 
2 Mr. Kucharski then just wanted to address with the court would 
3 be that on page 2, paragraph 4, it said he was placed on six 
4 consecutive periods of supervision. He just wanted it 
5 clarified that all of those periods stems from one series of 
6 bad checks. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Which page? 
8 MS. GEORGE: That would be page 2, paragraph 4. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. And what did you say? 
10 MS. GEORGE: Where it has investigator — 
11 THE COURT: Six periods. 
12 MS. GEORGE: Yeah. Investigator comment there, that 
13 second sentence, it says hefs been placed on six consecutive 
14 hearings of supervision. Mr. Kucharski!s concern was that the 
15 criminal activity stemmed from one period of criminal activity 
16 and that it looks as though he had several series of that. And 
17 he did successfully complete that. And he said that's not 
18 reflected in there either. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. What's the position of the County 
20 as to that statement? This is under investigator comment, the 
21 first paragraph. 
22 MR. POLL: Yes. I have no objection if the court 
23 wants to consider the fact that he, that the six consecutive 
24 periods of supervision were the result of a long-term crime 
25 I spree. 
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THE COURT: Okay. As — so end the second sentence 
to say, periods of supervision as a result of one, one — how 
do you want to phrase that? Longer criminal episode? 
MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then Ifm going to say add to the 
paragraph, or add to the sentence, six consecutive periods of 
supervision as a result of one longer episode, period. And 
then where do you want to have him saying that he completed 
that successfully? 
MS. GEORGE: We could just put that right after that 
sentence, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there any objection to that 
from the counsel for the State? 
MR. POLL: Ifm trying to find the — if defense 
counsel could point to somewhere, indicates where it was 
successful. 
THE DEFENDANT: That's completion. That's not here 
at all. That's the problem. That was the issue. 
MS. GEORGE: It was information that he believes AP&P 
possessed but failed to put in the report. 
MR. POLL: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll put he completed discover --
excuse me, supervision successfully after the — 
MR. POLL: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: — after the no longer episode. 
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1 MS, GEORGE: And what he's concerned then is that 
2 last sentence in that same section, in investigator comment, 
3 where it says, he's simply not conducive to supervision and 
4 lesser restrictive setting than prison. 
5 I realize at this point where he's been to prison, it 
6 makes the sentence essentially moot, but his concern is that it 
7 looks as if prison was the only alternative based on his lack 
8 of compliance for earlier probations. So that is one of the 
9 situations where he's already been to prison. It doesn't make 
10 a difference as far as what your Honor would sentence him to at 
11 this point. He just wants it noted that he believes that 
12 sentence is put in there based on the earlier sentence that he 
13 had six separate periods of supervision. 
14 THE COURT: Well, okay. How does he know it's that 
15 versus the sentence just before that? 
16 MS. GEORGE: And I don't believe that he would, your 
17 Honor. I guess maybe clarification from the court of what you 
18 would be relying on would be sentence one and not sentence two 
19 of the second paragraph? 
20 THE COURT: No, I basically think the sentence that 
21 says the defendant has established instances of repetitive 
22 criminal contact and continued criminal behavior subsequent to 
23 arrest, I think that was a big, big, big issue. 
24 MS. GEORGE: Okay. So the court's indicating it 
25 wasn't necessarily sentence two that the court relied on for 
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1 prison? 
2 THE COURT: No. 
3 MS. GEORGE: So that would take care of that issue. 
4 The other issue he had was page 3, paragraph 1 which 
5 would be regarding how the checks were made out. We've covered 
6 that already, your Honor, that there were two separate 
7 instances of work, and I provided that to the court. 
8 And I believe in going through the documentation of 
9 what I!ve been able to find from the earlier case that this 
10 information was provided verbally to the court. It was not in 
11 the presentence report as a written comment, but it was 
12 verbally provided to the court. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. So what do you wish to have happen 
14 on that? 
15 MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, what he provides to me today 
16 is the Champion Window's letter that he has, two different 
17 managers, Sasha Strands, the office manager. This was written 
18 on March 1st, 2007. So I'm not sure if this was provided to 
19 the court before — oh, it was faxed here. That he had — 
20 THE COURT: It was faxed to where? 
21 MS. GEORGE: To the court. He indicates if I 
22 could — 
23 THE DEFENDANT: The Clerk's — Clerk's Office over 
24 here. The day of sentencing he didn't know anything about 
25 this. And I asked, I called over to them and asked them to 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 63 4-5549 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 provide this information which is available to Mr. Arrington at 
2 the original time but never presented. The manager that was 
3 ultimately let go from Champion Windows who authorized me to do 
4 the side job, claimed that I moved to Texas or possibly Arizona 
5 which was claimed, you know, the factual statement; when the 
6 truth is I was transferred to the Dallas Office, still working 
7 for Champion. I was not running; I was not hiding. And these 
8 letters clarify that. 
9 THE COURT: So where do you want these letters going 
10 into, which paragraphs? 
11 MS. GEORGE: I think what we could do is just, if we 
12 could correct, and again, for the record, for Mr. Kucharski!s 
13 sake as well, the manager could tell anyone anything and there 
.14 isn't any way to prove that differently, but what Mr. Kucharski 
15 is saying is he didn't move to Arizona as it states in 
16 paragraph 2. He was transferred by the corporation, the 
17 company to the Texas office. 
18 And so perhaps what we could do is after paragraph 2, 
19 we could just put a sentence in there that states, 
20 Mr. Kucharski was transferred by Champion Window to the Texas 
21 office. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. I'm crossing out possibly to 
23 Arizona, and just say moved, transferred to the Dallas, Texas 
24 office, period. 
25 MS. GEORGE: Okay. And what Mr. Kucharski is now 
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1 saying, your Honor, is that the he believes the way it was 
2 listed showed an intent to defraud by fleeing the State for 
3 prosecution. Again, I think those letters then disprove that, 
4 that he was transferred by the company itself. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MS. GEORGE: Mr. Kucharski is stating that the victim 
7 in this case where the Champion Windows went back to Champion 
8 Windows and tried to talk to the manager who came to court 
9 here, and that manager threw the victim out of their office. 
10 So I don't know that thatTs relevant other than to just let the 
11 court know even the victim had tried to resolve this issue and 
12 it wasn't something Champion was willing to do at that time. 
13 So that takes care of page 3, paragraph 1 and 2 corrections. 
14 And then, your Honor, the next issue that my client 
15 had was that the report said there were 52 days served and 
16 there were actually 75 they served incarceration. Again, I 
17 think that issue might be moot at this point — 
18 THE COURT: Well, was that raised at the time? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I believe it was. 
20 MR. POLL: The State would have no objection to him 
21 receiving credit for 75 — 
22 THE COURT: I'm putting after serving 75 days under 
23 E, custody status. 
24 MS. GEORGE: And then, your Honor, the next issue — 
25 I THE COURT: And I will say 23 days didn't make a big 
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1 I difference in what the sentence was. 
2 MS. GEORGE: Your Honor/ the other issue that he had 
3 is that in the listing of criminal history, that information 
4 I included not only cases that were dismissed, but something that 
5 was such, of such a nature such as licensing a dog, and his 
6 concern was that AP&P was trying to sort of load the report 
7 with information that was negative — 
8 THE COURT: Well, is it wrong that he failed to 
9 license his dog or he had an animal at large in a Class C 
10 misdemeanor or is it just that it looks bad? 
11 MS. GEORGE: It's clearly a violation of the law, and 
12 AP&P puts all of those in there. I think — 
13 THE COURT: Well, I'm asking is it true or is it not 
14 true? And he had to pay a fine? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, had to pay a fine, yes, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Then what, what is the reason to 
17 take that out if it's a Class C misdemeanor? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: I was told in 1999 it would actually 
19 be removed from my record if I paid the fine. So it was 
20 actually my ex-wife's dog. It wasn't even my dog. I was the 
21 one home, and that's why I got the ticket. 
22 THE COURT: Well, if anybody believes that I sent you 
23 to prison because you failed to license your dog or had an 
24 animal at large, a Class C misdemeanor, that you paid a fine 
25 late in 1999, it had nothing to do at all with what I did. 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, it's not much that point; 
2 it's the point the dismissed cases are still on here. Those 
3 kind of things. 
4 THE COURT: I don't — when I see dismissed cases on 
5 there, I don't think about them. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: You may not, but the board does. The 
7 board uses these two to determine what I am going to do down at 
8 the prison. 
9 MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, as a matter of course, I 
10 believe that presentence reports always include matters 
11 dismissed or those that actually went to trial and were 
12 acquitted and those that are actually settled by conviction. I 
13 think it was just Mr. Kucharski's concern that it lent an 
14 errand that he had many more criminal cases than what he'd 
15 actually done. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MS. GEORGE: And your Honor, the next issue that he 
18 had was that in the life section it listed that he's — 
19 THE COURT: Which page? 
20 MS. GEORGE: In the — it's page 7. 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MS. GEORGE: And it would be the last sentence of the 
23 first paragraph. His concern again, your Honor, this is just 
24 the way the report is drafted, that it states he claims to have 
25 suffered from migraines. He indicates that he's been diagnosed 
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1 with those, and that information was provided — 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Which paragraph? 
3 MS. GEORGE: It would be paragraph 1, the last 
4 sentence. His concern — 
5 THE COURT: He claims he's suffered, he's been 
6 diagnosed? 
7 MS. GEORGE: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Instead to have claimed to have suffered? 
9 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Diagnosed with? Okay. 
11 MS. GEORGE: By muscular migraines, yes. 
12 THE COURT: All right. That's been changed. 
13 MS. GEORGE: And then in the employment section — 
14 THE COURT: Yes. 
15 MS. GEORGE: — it's stated that he studied diesel 
16 mechanics and he indicates that what he actually did was 
17 complete a two-year course for diesel mechanics. 
18 THE COURT: So for approximately two years? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: No, that's only 10 months. I did the 
20 program in only 10 months. 
21 THE COURT: Well, so it's accurate, you studied it 
22 for a year. Is that correct? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Graduated the program. 
24 I MS. GEORGE: So that might be the way to resolve it 
25 I and put graduated. 
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1 I THE COURT: And graduated. Okay. That's been 
2 changed. 
3 MS. GEORGE: And then where it says, second 
4 paragraph, Defendant works for H&K Motor Sports, he owns that. 
5 So if we could have that changed to the defendant owns H&K 
6 Motor Sports. 
7 THE COURT: Any objection to that change? 
8 MR. POLL: No, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. It's changed. 
10 MS. GEORGE: Okay. And then it says, employed by 
11 Computex. If you go to the next sentence, he owns Computex, or 
12 owned Computex. 
13 MR. POLL: No objection to that being changed. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Well, how do you want to say it? 
15 Says he was employed as a sales representative. 
16 , THE DEFENDANT: I was the owner, so — 
17 THE COURT: So from 1997 until 2004 — 
18 MS. GEORGE: The defendant owned Computex. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Period? 
20 MS. GEORGE: Period, yes. 
21 THE COURT: Then I've changed that. 
22 MS. GEORGE: And then the final thing on that 
23 paragraph it states, although he claims he was earning 100,000 
24 a year, he quit the job in his desire to race cars. His 
25 J response to that, your Honor, is that he did not quit the job 
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1 to race cars, he had just started a new company, H&K, to have 
2 race cars. ITm not sure how your Honor would want to address 
3 that. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Are you saying he — did he quit a 
5 job that was paying 100,000 a year? 
6 MS. GEORGE: He sold Computex, your Honor, yes, and 
7 then started H&K Motor Sports. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: And just to clarify, the reason 
9 behind my concern with these points is because not just to show 
10 that — since it will affect me, but it affects my employees. 
11 And that was the concern here originally. These employees all 
12 had to be let go and those kind of things. 
13 THE COURT: What's the response to the State on that 
14 last sentence under education of employment financial 
15 information? 
16 MR. POLL: I — your Honor, if they could repeat how 
17 they wanted that changed. This is the very last sentence where 
18 he claims he was earning 100,000 a year. He quit his job for 
19 his desire to race cars. How do you want — 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Ifm okay with just removing that 
21 entire last sentence all together. 
22 THE COURT: Is there any objection to that? 
23 MR. POLL: No, your Honor. 
24 I THE DEFENDANT: And in fixing the other ones to show 
25 I I was the owner. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. It's released. I got owners on 
2 the two H&K and Computex. And the last line has been 
3 eliminated. 
4 MS. GEORGE: And then, your Honor, the final thing 
5 would be on the mitigating circumstances page after 
6 aggravating, what Mr. Kucharski's concern is, is that there 
7 were aggravating circumstances checked in the original 
8 presentence report, but he doesn't believe that any were 
9 addressed for mitigation. 
10 THE COURT: Okay, and what do you claim they should 
11 be? 
12 MS. GEORGE: One, your Honor, that the offender's 
13 criminal conduct neither caused or threatened serious harm. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. What's the State's response? 
15 MR. POLL: The State would agree that no physical 
16 harm, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to put serious 
18 physical harm there and put a check in that box. 
19 MS. GEORGE: And then that No. 6, your Honor, 
20 restitution would have been severely compromised by 
21 incarceration. He went to prison, so I'm not sure how to 
22 address that. But he believes the issue should have been 
23 addressed by counsel he had at the time. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Well, we're not here to do that. 
25 MS. GEORGE: And your Honor — 
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1 THE COURT: Because they've said because our 
2 disposition makes it unnecessary to consider alternative 
3 arguments alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. So 
4 I'm only going to do what I have to do. I don't have to do 
5 that. 
6 MS. GEORGE: So that one we'll list as moot. 
7 And then seven, your Honor, may well be moot as well 
8 because he's gone to prison. So when it talks about the 
9 amenability to supervision, he's already been to prison. So 
10 seven — 
11 THE COURT: But were these things brought up at the 
12 time? Were these things brought up or brought up to his 
13 counsel and not brought up to me, is that what happened? 
14 MS. GEORGE: I would have him address the court 
15 because I don't know, your Honor. 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Again, it's been over three years 
17 since sentencing. So it's hard for me to, you know, remember 
18 verbatim exactly each one of these points that were not 
19 handled. I told my attorney at the time these are the 
20 inaccuracies. And I understand what you just said, that we're 
21 not here to address, you know, improper counsel. 
22 THE COURT: Yes. 
23 I THE DEFENDANT: I agree. But what the Court of 
24 | Appeals did say was the errors in the PSI need to be addressed 
25 I And these are errors. Whether he addressed them or not, at 
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this point the Court of Appeals has determined that these need 
to be addressed. 
THE COURT: But I'm just to address the alleged 
inaccuracies that were set at the time of sentencing. I'm 
not — that's why I am asking if these were brought up at the 
time of sentencing because I can't — I only have to resolve 
alleged inaccuracies that were done at the time of sentencing. 
THE DEFENDANT: There was a laundry list. I 
apologize. I don't remember exactly which ones that were 
detailed by Mr. Jardine. 
MS. GEORGE: And perhaps the way to remedy that would 
be to just state that Mr. Kucharski has indicated that 
mitigating circumstances No. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 14 
should have been addressed because and they may have persuaded 
your Honor not to send him to prison. They all address whether 
prison was an appropriate sentence or not. Again, that would 
go to that ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and I 
realize we are not here to address that. 
THE COURT: Okay, what is the County's position of 
that statement? 
MR. POLL: Well, with regard to what was addressed 
and what wasn't addressed, I mean, it would seem to me like the 
things we should be addressing are laid out in Mr. Jardine's 
objection of the presentence report. And if they are not laid 
out there, many of these things may be brought up now for the 
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 6 3 4-5549 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 first time for — 
2 THE COURT: Okay. And are you saying they were 
3 brought up there on as it relates to 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 
4 I 14 of mitigating circumstances? 
5 MR. POLL: I'm not seeing it in their original 
6 objection, but if you could give me the numbers again. 
7 THE COURT: One, 6, 7 through 10, 12 and 14. 
8 MR. POLL: Okay. Your Honor, if I can just quickly 
9 address them. We already addressed Count I, No. 1. 
10 THE COURT: Right. 
11 MR. POLL: No. 6 is really a speculative statement, 
12 and I think the court has already heard, and we just ask the 
13 court to consider the defendant's statements regarding whether 
14 restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
15 I The State would argue based upon defendant's history that — I 
16 mean, it's just speculation on whether or not he would have 
17 paid restitution had he been out other than the fact that he' s 
18 J ordered too. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Before you start there, I'm just 
20 asking if these things were not in Mr. Jardine's objection to 
21 the presentence report, is it your memory or not that these 
22 were included or discussed, these mitigation circumstances. 
23 That was my question. 
24 MR. POLL: I wasn't present at that hearing, your 
25 Honor. I don't have recollection, but — 
XT — 4- ~. -.„ ** ~~ 4 
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MS. GEORGE: And your Honor — 
MR. POLL: I understand the reason why we are here is 
to address those things that were brought up — 
THE COURT: And had to be resolved. 
MR. POLL: — and had to be resolved, not things that 
we've now since three years later — 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. POLL: — come up with. 
THE COURT: No, that's right. 
MR. POLL: And --
MS. GEORGE: Mr. Kucharski indicates that he had a 
check for full restitution that he brought to court that day. 
So I don't know if that was brought to the court's attention or 
not. 
THE DEFENDANT: It was. 
MS. GEORGE: And I don't know how that would play 
into that. I just wanted that on the record, that he indicated 
he had been prepared to paid that at the time and when 
sentenced to prison then the family used that money instead to 
take care of his wife and children while he was incarcerated. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm a little confused. 
Mr. Kucharski has been saying it was Mr. Arrington and now it 
wasn't Mr. Arrington at all, it was Mr. Jardine. 
THE DEFENDANT: I had two others. I filed a 
complaint against Mr. Arrington and that' s the hearing we had 
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1 where back and forth — 
2 THE COURT: Okay, but then did you have Mr. Jardine? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: And how many items were in his objection 
5 there? 
6 MR. POLL: Seventeen paragraphs. I take them to be 
7 I items. 
8 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. POLL: It's my understanding that this is what 
was presented at sentencing, correct? The subjection — 
THE DEFENDANT: He submitted it, it wasn't addressed 
on the record which is why we are here now. 
MR. POLL: Right. And that's my understanding. So 
it seems we ought to be maybe working from Mr. Jardine's. 
THE DEFENDANT: The Attorney General's Office brought 
up the same argument. The Attorney General's Office originally 
argued certain points of this. And the (inaudible) said no, 
instead of just dealing with one or two or three items they all 
need to be readdressed. 
MR. POLL: And I think we just need to work off of 
the order which — 
THE COURT: Okay, so we get to start over, is that 
what you are saying? Okay. All these things we just did are 
not the same? Did you have reference to that? 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, what I did was I took the 
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appellate order and then had Mr. Kucharski go through that. 
And I think at this point for judicial economy, what 
Mr. Kucharski and I put on the record, covers those issues. He 
went back through that presentence report for me. As new 
counsel what I would submit to the court is we've covered 
those. 
THE COURT: Could I just see those for a minute, 
since — 
Okay. Each of the things that you brought up so far 
up to the mitigating circumstances have been covered in 
Mr. Jardine's objection to the presentence report. So — okay, 
I'll give that back to you. 
MS. GEORGE: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Okay, well, as it relates to the 
mitigating circumstances, I'm putting those as basically 
ineffective assistance of counsel. I understand what the 
argument has been that they should have been brought, or 
they're brought up through counsel, but they were not brought 
up to me before. And they are not in that report. 
MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. 
And then he mentioned that he had asked in the past 
too that the sentence be overturned on the basis that he had a 
plea agreement with the County Attorney's Office and that was 
not what the court sentenced him to. However, the law is very 
clear and the plea agreement is clear that the court's agreed 
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1 to sentence a defendant to whatever the court believes is 
2 I appropriate regardless — 
3 THE COURT: I believe that was brought up at the time 
4 of sentencing — 
5 MS. GEORGE: Yes, and I believe — 
6 THE COURT: — and I think it was contrary to the 
7 quote, deal, that I never bound myself to follow. 
8 MS. GEORGE: And I just explained to him that that is 
9 now dealt with and I cannot ask the court to revisit that 
10 issue. I just wanted the record clear that it canft be 
11 revisited. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MS. GEORGE: And at this point, your Honor, we would 
14 submit if the court — 
15 THE COURT: Okay, if you want to make any argument to 
16 all those changes that have been made to the presentence 
17 report, if you believe that they would have caused a different 
18 sentence to do, and I'm going to ask the State to do the same 
19 thing, if you wish to make such an argument. 
20 MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor. What Mr. Kucharski had 
21 asked in revisiting the sentence is that he believes that the 
22 way the errors were contained in the report is that it gave the 
23 court the idea that he has had many, many years of history of 
24 I defrauding people and not paying for his obligations, and that 
25 | that's not the case. That he has had successful businesses as 
.1,,, n J 
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1 what is indicated in the report. He!s made money off of those. 
2 That he was transferred to Texas. He hasn't tried to flee to 
3 get away from criminal responsibility. That he has paid 
4 restitution on that other case, and that he's done everything 
5 that he could to make sure that the parties were whole. 
6 And in this case he came to court with restitution 
7 money and had tried to resolve it in a way that the victims 
8 were not out money for several months, if not a year, and that 
9 he has owned up to his responsibilities. He's come to court 
10 and he's been responsible. And the issues that he raised, he 
11 believes essentially gave the court the opinion that he makes 
12 his money off of defrauding people and then flaunting the law. 
13 And that is not the situation. 
14 And he is back with his family. They are dealing 
15 with medical issues with his wife and child. And he would ask 
16 the court to consider his request, not to put him on probation 
17 with AP&P or supervision or change his officer from Casy 
18 Nelson. And he would get the restitution paid as quickly as he 
19 can. 
20 THE COURT: All right, the State. 
21 MR. POLL: Your Honor, the defendant has led a trail 
22 I of fraud, and I think essentially showing that he is a con man. 
23 This case is also a fraud case. The defendant plead guilty to 
24 that in showing once again that he is nothing but fraud. 
25 He indicates that he wants to mitigate the 
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1 circumstances regarding allegations that he left the state. 
2 Our records indicate in December of 2005, December 8th, he 
3 failed to appear. A bench warrant was issued. We had a bail 
4 bonds hearing six months, about seven months later in July. 
5 And then August 30th of 2006, and we'd learned that he'd been 
6 arrested in Phoenix and that he was going to waive extradition 
7 The defendant had already appeared a number of times on this 
8 case so he knew this case was pending. 
9 In the objection to the presentence report filed by 
10 his attorney, Mr. Jardine, it indicates that Eddie Kucharski 
11 admits that the current wrongdoing occurred during a time he 
12 was on supervised probation, but yet today argues that he 
13 should be a candidate for probation and that any allegation or 
14 suggestion otherwise in the presentence report is improper. 
15 But yet everything we have shows that he's not a good candidate 
16 for probation. 
17 I would just also indicate, your Honor, that whatever 
18 sentence is given, that the court could consider that the 
19 defendant needs to make substantial payments towards 
20 restitution if he owns companies and has had such good 
21 employment then we could expect that restitution be paid 
22 quickly. 
23 Your Honor, I believe that his record of fraud, of 
24 continuing crime, of violating or have committing a crime while 
25 he was on probation and just this case itself deserves a prison 
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1 sentence. 
2 MS. GEORGE: And, your Honor, in response — 
3 THE COURT: All right, any response? 
4 MS. GEORGE: Well, just that that's not what the plea 
5 agreement was. In fact, the County Attorney's office signed 
6 the plea agreement stating that they weren't recommending no 
7 prison. So Mr. Kucharski's concern is now to come back in and 
8 say that, he feels like they were bound by their obligation not 
9 to make that recommendation. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 
11 MR. POLL: Yeah, the response from the State is the 
12 fact that we're here today to discuss what was considered, 
13 whether or not the court considered that and whether things 
14 were proper to be considered for a prison sentence. Defendant 
15 has stood here today arguing various reasons why prison is 
16 inappropriate suggesting that the court acted inappropriately. 
17 It's the State's job and position to make an argument of why 
18 his arguments are flawed. So I don't believe that the original 
19 agreement of no prison stands at this point because we are at a 
20 different point in the game. We honored our agreement. And 
21 the issue that we are dealing with now is what, what was to be 
22 considered, what is to be considered now, and so I think it's 
23 appropriate for me to make those arguments. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Any last few words? 
25 MS. GEORGE: Then Mr. Kucharski would ask to set 
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1 aside the plea on the basis that the State is not abiding by 
2 the plea agreement and would like that — 
3 THE COURT: Well, that is not before me and I think 
4 that is moot. So that is not before me. 
5 What is before me is a decision from the Utah Court 
6 of Appeals, dated October 16th of 2009 in the case of State of 
7 Utah versus Eddie Kucharski. And the concern that is stated on 
8 page 2 of that decision is that the alleged inaccuracies were 
9 not resolved by the District Court, that being me at the time 
10 of sentencing. 
11 And so it was to be remanded to allow the court to 
12 resolve objections on the record. And the court stated, This 
13 disposition is appropriate in the present case because 
14 Kucharski alleges that he was prejudiced by the failure to 
15 resolve the alleged inaccuracies in the report allowing the 
16 District Court to revisit the sentences. After resolving the 
17 alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report 
18 gives appropriate deference to the District Court sentencing 
19 function. Accordingly we remand the case so, quote, the 
20 sentencing judge can consider the objections to the presentence 
21 report, make findings on the record as to whether the 
22 information objected to is accurate, and determine on the 
23 record whether the information is relevant to sentencing. 
24 I So first of all, we've gone through both looking at 
25 | the report of Mr. Jardine that was considered previously at the 
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1 hearing that were basically the same issues that Ms. George has 
2 gone through. I've made the changes where everything that was 
3 asked except the attitude and orientation paragraph and the 
4 mitigation statements that I deemed, the ineffective assistance 
5 of counsel type of claims that were not before me. 
6 So the next issue is the court stated, After 
7 resolving the alleged inaccuracies that have now been done in 
8 the presentence report, the District Court may revise the 
9 sentence as it deems appropriate. And our disposition makes it 
10 unnecessary to consider alternative arguments alleged in 
11 ineffective assistance of counsel. 
12 What I would say in response to what we have done 
13 today is all of these changes that you've made, even if you 
14 want to take out the attitude and orientation change, the 
15 problem with this case and the problem that I didn't go along 
16 with what the plea was, was because Mr. Kucharski had had a 
17 history with me. And that paragraph under investigator 
18 comment, the second paragraph, the first sentence, the 
19 defendant has established instances of repetitive criminal 
20 conduct and continued criminal behavior. 
21 And that was the issue that was critical. And it was 
22 the issue that he was going from company to company, doing 
23 similar types of crimes, and basically thinking he could get 
24 away with it. That more than anything else — it wasn't the 
25 dog license failure. It really wasn't anything about the — 
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1 other than the record that I had had with him. And despite 
2 what the recommendation was by the county or the defendant was 
3 that he deserved to go to prison because of the continued 
4 behavior. Probation hadn't changed him in the past under 
5 supervised probation, and he continued to commit crimes. 
6 And so I'm stating as a matter of fact and law that 
7 all the inaccuracies that have been addressed here that I have 
8 agreed to and agreed to what Mr. Kucharski said would not and 
9 will not change the sentence that I gave him to go to zero to 
10 five years in prison. So I do not see any reason to revise the 
11 sentence because those things did not affect it. 
12 Having said that he's on probation — or he's on 
13 parole from the prison with whatever the prison does, and I 
14 don' t control that anymore than I control what he does at the 
15 prison or what the jail does. 
16 So I believe that resolves the matter. Is there 
17 anything else that needs to be addressed? 
18 MS. GEORGE: Your Honor, just quickly for the record 
19 so Mr. Kucharski is clear on what the court is saying is that 
20 he's been to prison, and because he did not expirate, meaning 
21 served his full prison sentence by being on AP&P supervision at 
22 this time, that's a condition of parole, and your Honor doesn't 
23 have jurisdiction over that. Is that correct? 
24 THE COURT: That's accurate. 
25 MS. GEORGE: Okay, and then the issue he wanted to 
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address was restitution. 
THE COURT: Well, the restitution issue is addressed 
with AP&P and parole. 
MS. GEORGE: If I could just quickly, the report 
indicates that 6300, that's what we thought it was, but for 
some reason that figure was changed over $10,000 at the Utah 
State Prison, and I don't know why. 
THE COURT: It's called interest. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's not interest — it's before the 
interest. 
MS. GEORGE: So what I will do — 
THE COURT: Well, that's something — if there's 
something that's gone from the time than what we stated and 
what the prison states, you're going to have to work with the 
prison because I don't know how they didn't take what we put or 
what I put on the sentencing in this. 
THE DEFENDANT: Because they went through by PSI 
because Champion Windows got some civilly by the victim as 
well. I was not — I was originally — my civil case was 
dropped. Presently in the PSI Champion Windows paid a payment 
to the victim. I was there — not trying to hit me with it. 
So my PO — 
THE COURT: Well, I know, but if what you are saying 
is that I put an amount of restitution, and now you are saying 
that number is higher? 
L 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: $10,414. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I can only deal with what I 
3 I did, and I can' t change what the prison does. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: I'm just asking to affirm the 
5 restitution amount. That's all I'm asking. 
6 I THE COURT: I'm going to — basically whatever is in 
7 I the original sentence is what I ordered. 
MS. GEORGE: Yes, your Honor, and that would take 
care of it. Thank you very much, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
(The preceding proceedings were concluded.) 
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